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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the problem of optimally partitioning
a design process of a complex product, and to derive several comparative statics
results by utilizing the technique developed by Topkis (1998). By partitioning the
product design and assigning each sub-design to a team, there are the beneﬁt of
having many smaller real options on the one hand, and the cost resulting from
an increased incidence of across-team coordination on the other. Furthermore, by
endogenizing the across-team coordination costs, our analysis shows that lower cost
of within-team coordination induces coarser partitions and higher costs of across-
team coordination, i.e. lower level of information and communication technology
(ICT) investment. It is argued that these results may explain the reason for the
retarded introduction of the ICT by Japanese ﬁrms in the 1970s and 1980s as
well as the diﬀerence of performance between Route 128 and Silicon Valley in the
1990s. It is also argued that our results are consistent with the empirical ﬁnding by
Brynjolfsson, Maline, Gurbaxani, and Kambil (1994) that ICT leads to decreases in
ﬁrm size.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D21;L23;O32
Keywords: Coordination; Modular design; Option value;
Supermodularity; Monotone comparative statics
1I am grateful to Masahiko Aoki, Fukihiko Funaki, Nobuo Ikeda, Michihiro Kandori, Toshiji Kawagoe,
Takuya Nakaizumi, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Atsuomi Obayashi, Mitsuo Suzuki for their helpful
comments and discussions.If there are n workers on a project, there are (n2 −n)/2 interfaces across which
there may be communication, and there are potentially almost 2n teams within
which coordination must occur. The purpose of organization is to reduce the amount
of communication and coordination necessary; hence organization is a radical attack
on the communication problems treated above.
— Frederic P. Brooks, 1995, pp.78-79
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the problem of optimally partitioning a design process of a complex
product, and derives several comparative statics results by utilizing the technique devel-
oped by Topkis (1998). A designing organization comprises design tasks, each of which
determines new design speciﬁcation of a design parameter for a system product. Design
tasks/parameters are usually intricately dependent upon one another. By partitioning the
design and assigning sub-designs to design teams, there are the beneﬁt of having many
smaller real options on the one hand, and the cost resulting from an increased incidence
of across-team coordination on the other.
The analysis in this paper is primarily relevant to organizations and/or quasi-
organizations engaged in designing a complex system, such as software or computer sys-
tem. However, it may also be applicable to organizations and/or quasi-organizations
where containing coordination costs is of major importance. Dealing with the relation-
ship between coordination costs and a design, this paper is also concerned with such
design concepts as architecture, an interface and modularity, which have been highlighted
by the outstanding development of information and communication technology (ICT) in
the recent decades.
Our analysis shows that the optimal partition will be coarser if the cost of across-team
coordination is higher, the cost of within-team coordination is lower, the uncertainty
concerning R&D activities is lower, and the ICT investment is more expensive. These
conﬁrm the result obtained by Baldwin and Clark (2000) and Schaefer (1999). We also
endogenize the cost of across-team coordination. Our ﬁndings are as follows; (1) lower
cost of within-team coordination induces higher cost of across-team coordination (i.e.
lower level of ICT investment) and coarser partitions to be chosen; and (2) lower cost
of ICT investment induces lower cost of across-team coordination and ﬁner partitions
to be chosen. It is argued that the former result throws some light on the retarded
introduction of new ICT by Japanese ﬁrms, while the latter result is consistent with the
1empirical ﬁnding by Brynjolfsson, Maline, Gurbaxani, and Kambil (1994) that the ﬁrm
size becomes smaller as the ﬁrms invest in the ICT. We also discuss the relation of our
analyses to the concept of modularization.
This paper is closely related to Baldwin and Clark (2000) and Schaefer (1999). To the
best of our knowledge, Baldwin and Clark’s is the most comprehensive work to elucidate
the reason that the computer industry has dramatically increased its rate of product in-
novation since the 1970’s and has been divided into many smaller sub-industries. They
identiﬁed “modularity-in-design” as the major driving force behind the heightened pace
of this change. By modularizing a system, one interdependent whole is transformed into
many independent subsystems (i.e. modules). Then the system of one large option is
turned into the sum of many smaller options, which creates more value (the value of
splitting). Of course, they do note that modularization can be costly. They argue that
modularization incurs the cost of creating and disseminating architecture, running exper-
iments, and testing the compatibility of modules. However, they do not fully formalize
these costs to analyze the determinants of optimal partition.
A ﬁrst formal approach was taken by Schaefer, who combined Baldwin and Clark’s
concept of modularity-in-design with the economics of supermodular functions. In his
paper, partitioning a designing organization creates more value because each design team
can specialize in a smaller number of design tasks, while the cost aspect of his model
is based on the fundamental insight by Milgrom and Roberts (1995). He assumes that
partitioning a designing organization reduces the correlation between research shocks
in diﬀerent teams. Because the value function of the whole system is assumed to be
supermodular in the values of component modules, ﬁner partition lowers the value of the
whole system.
The model in this paper may be regarded as an extention of the model by Baldwin and
Clark in the sense that the beneﬁt of partitioning a product design is derived from having
many smaller options instead of one large option. However our model diﬀers from theirs
in that we explicitly model and focus upon coordination costs incurred in partitioning a
product design, which enable us to conduct a formal comparative statics analysis regarding
coordination costs. This paper is also in line with Schaefer’s in that both Schaefer’s and
ours make a comparative statics analysis with respect to communication costs. However,
he introduces communication cost as a casual parameter having eﬀect on the cost of
buying some level of correlation between research shocks in diﬀerent components, while
the coordination cost in the present paper is naturally derived from partitioning a design
2process into several sub-designs and assigning them to diﬀerent teams. We also explicitly
considers an optimization problem over the set of possible partitions, which is shown to
be a lattice. Although the modeling approaches are diﬀerent, Schaefer’s paper and ours
share the conclusion that a coarser partition is favored under higher cost of across-team
coordination and lower cost of within-team coordination. This paper provides further
insight into the relation between the cost of across-team and within-team coordination by
endogenizing the cost of across-team coordination.
Although we would like to restrict our present focus to the design process of a complex
product, some aspects of the results obtained in the paper seem to be relevant to a more
general argument on the division of labor (Smith 1776/1991). Adam Smith argues that
the division of labor leads to greater knowledge, while Becker and Murphy (1992) assert
that the causation may also go from greater general knowledge to a more extensive divi-
sion of labor and greater task-speciﬁc knowledge. Our results indicate that less expensive
coordination costs, as realized by the development of transportational means and/or in-
formation and communication technologies, may cause a more extensive division of labor.
It should be noted that our model focuses not on the eﬃciency of general production pro-
cesses but on that of R&D activities. However, the our comparative statics result on the
optimal partition is not so much dependent on the beneﬁt from having a ﬁner partition as
on the coordination costs. So the same logic should be applicable to broader situations.
The next section sets up the framework for the analysis throughout the paper. Based
upon the basic insight embodied in “Design Structure Matrix (DSM) Mapping,” a grand
design is deﬁned as a binary relation on the set of design parameters. Design teams are
introduced by partitioning design parameters (tasks) into groups. Section 3 focuses upon
the cost of coordination arising from partitioning a designing organization, and the basic
property of the cost function is derived. Section 4 turns to the analysis of the beneﬁt
of partitioning a designing organization. In this section we follow Baldwin and Clark
and identiﬁes the beneﬁt of partitioning as having many smaller options instead of one
large option. In Section 5, we integrate both cost and beneﬁt aspects to give comparative
statics results and relate those results to Baldwin and Clark’s argument of modularization.
Section 6 provides some discussion of the obtained results and concludes the paper.
32 The model of a designing organization
According to Baldwin and Clark (2000), A design of an artifact is its complete descrip-
tion, which in turn can be broken down into smaller units called design parameters.F o r
example, in order to design a mug cup, such design parameters as color, material, height,
etc., have to be completely speciﬁed. Usually very intricate interdependencies among
those parameters exist, which we call design structure. The design structure can be easily
visualized by means of a technique called “Design Structure Matrix (DSM) mapping,”
which was invented by Steward (1981) and further developed by Eppinger (1991). In a
DSM matrix, design parameters are listed on the rows and columns. If ith parameter is
aﬀected by jth parameter, then we put a mark “x” in the cell where ith row and jth
column intersect. See Figure 1. The design tasks are to choose those parameters. It is


































Figure 1: A generic design structure matrix (DSM)
Now consider an organization engaged in designing a complex artifact. We modify
the above deﬁnition of a DSM matrix so that each design parameter/task requires design
eﬀorts by exactly one designer. This can be done by bundling the original design parame-
ters/tasks that are closely related to one another into a new design parameter/task in the
modiﬁed DSM matrix. Henceforth we suppose that one designer is engaged in each design
task. Thus there is a one-to-one correspondence among a design parameter, a design task
4and a designer. Suppose that there are n design parameters/tasks. Let us denote the
set of all design parameters/tasks by N = {1,···,n}.A grand design or architecture
is represented by a nonempty subset A of N × N with (i,i) / ∈ A for each i ∈ N.W e
interpret (i,j) ∈ A as expressing that design task i is dependent upon design task j so
that some coordination is necessary between them. In terms of the DSM, this corresponds
to the situation that the cell corresponding to (i,j) is marked by “x.” In what follows,
we investigate the optimal partition of N given a grand design A.
Mathematically, a partition P = {S1,···,S r(P)} of N is a family of subsets of N,s u c h
that
∀jS j  = ∅, ∀j  = kS j ∩ Sk = ∅, ∪
r(P)
j=1 Sj = N,
where r(P) is the number of elements in P. We introduce a binary relation on the set
of all partitions on N, denoted P(N), as follows. Let P1 and P2 be two partitions of N.
We say that P2 is coarser than P1 (alternatively P1 is ﬁner than P2)i ff o re a c hSi ∈ P1,
there exist Sj ∈ P2 such that Si ⊂ Sj; we write this P1   P2. Thus deﬁned binary
relation on P(N) is easily shown to be a partial ordering, and the partially ordered set
(P(N), ) is shown to be a lattice, where P1 ∨ P2 is the ﬁnest common coarsening of P1
and P2 and P1 ∧ P2 is the coarsest common reﬁnement of P1 and P2. This enables us
to treat the problem of optimally partitioning a product design as that of maximizing a
function on a lattice and therefore to apply the results obtained by Topkis (1998). Given
a partition, each design task belongs to one and the only one element of the partition.
Let us denote the element of partition P to which design parameter i belongs by S(i,P),
whose cardinality we denote as #S(i,P). Since each design task requires input of one
designer’s eﬀort, Sj is a group of design tasks as well as a group of people, which we call
“design team.” In what follows, we will use the partition of a product design and that of
a design organization interchangeably.
Partitioning the set of design tasks and creating design teams have dual functions in
the analyses that follow. First, we assume that the coordination across design teams is
more costly than that within a design team. Thus ﬁne partitions will be costly because of
the increased incidence of across-team coordination. Second, each design team is a unit of
decision-making regarding the adoption of new design parameters thereof. A new design
will be adopted if and only if the result of R&D in the current period is judged to be
better than the current value of the “component.” Thus the second assumption implies
that the size of design teams determine the size of real options. In sum, by partitioning
5the design, there are the beneﬁt of having many smaller real options on the one hand, and
the cost resulting from an increased incidence of across-team coordination on the other.
3 The Cost of Partitioning a Design Process
Let us now consider the coordination cost of partitioning a designing organization. Under
a grand design A, suppose that (i,j) ∈ A. A speciﬁc partition P determines for each
(i,j) ∈ A whether j ∈ S(i,P). Then let the cost of coordination between i and j be cij
if both i and j belong to the same design team, and let the coordination cost between
them be Cij if they belong to diﬀerent design teams. We assume that 0 <c ij <C ij for
each (i,j) ∈ A. That is, we assume that the coordination across design teams is more
costly than that within a design team. We write C =( Cij)(i,j)∈A and c =( cij)(i,j)∈A.
Henceforth, we suppose that R#A is endowed with the product ordering relation based on
the usual ordering relation on the real line R1.T h i sm a k e sR#A a lattice with x  ∨ x   =
(max(x 
1,x   
1),···,max(x 
#A,x   
#A)) and x  ∧ x   =( m i n ( x 
1,x   
1),···,min(x 
#A,x   
#A)) for x 
and x   in R#A.
Throughout the paper, we will use a broader term “coordination” rather than “commu-
nication,” because resolving dependencies between design parameters can involve some-
thing more than just communication between them. Nevertheless, the cost of coordination
will necessarily depend on that of communication.
Although some may think that the assumption that C>cis not trivial, it seems to be
classical. For example, Arrow (1975) presumes that integration yields superior auditing
technology. In a context more similar to ours, Becker and Murphy (1992) also implicitly
assume this condition, for their model supposes that each division incurs more coordi-
nation costs under ﬁner division of labor. More recently, Wernerfelt (2003) provides a
analytical model for explaining that coordination between divisions is harder than coor-
dination inside divisions. Thus, our current position is that although this condition may
needs further foundations, it is a stylized fact. As it appears in the opening quotation by
Brooks (1995), some organizational arrangement needs to be contrived to mitigate this
coordination problem. After all, the present paper aims at exploring the implication for
organization of the assumption rather than its foundations.
Intuitively speaking in the present context, members in the same design team will
resort to face-to-face communication very frequently, perhaps because they are located
closely. On the other hand, coordination across design teams will require some communi-
6cation devices like a facsimile, a telephone, the Internet, etc., which may limit the use of
subtle and complicated coordination. We may realize lower cost of across-team coordina-
tion by installing such devices with some costs, the implication of which we will explore
later by making C an endogenous variable.
Suppose that the cost of coordination incurred by the whole designing organization,
under the partition P and coordination costs (C,c), is the sum of coordination costs over














(Cij − cij)( 1 )
Next lemma is the key to the main theorem.
Lemma 1 K(P,C,c) is decreasing and submodular in P on P(N), and has increasing
diﬀerences in (P,(−C,c)).
Proof We ﬁrst show that K(P,C,c) is submodular in P on P(N). Pick any P1 and P2
from P(N). For each (i,j) ∈ A,e i t h e rj ∈ S(i,P1) or not, and similarly either j ∈ S(i,P2)
or not. Therefore we can partition A into 4 subsets. The subset of A, denoted G, consists
of all (i,j)’s such that j ∈ S(i,P1)a n dj ∈ S(i,P2). The second subset, denoted by H,
comprises all (i,j)’s such that j ∈ S(i,P1) but j/ ∈ S(i,P2). Similarly the third subset I is
composed of all (i,j)’s in A with j ∈ S(i,P2) but j/ ∈ S(i,P1). Finally the fourth subset
J contains all (i,j)’s with j/ ∈ S(i,P1)a n dj/ ∈ S(i,P2). Obviously they are disjoint and























Observing that S(i,P1) ∪ S(i,P2) ⊂ S(i,P1 ∨ P2),












































That K(P,C,c) is decreasing in P should be obvious. Next we show K(P,C,c)h a s
increasing diﬀerences in (K,(−C,c)). Pick any P   and P    with P   ≺ P   .
K(P




(i,j)∈A,j/ ∈S(i,P   )
(Cij − cij) −
 




(i,j)∈A,j∈S(i,P   ),j/ ∈S(i,P  )
(Cij − cij)
which obviously is increasing in −C and c. 
Given the assumption that coordination cost is higher across design teams than within
a design team, it is obviously the least costly to have the largest partition {N}. However,
there are also beneﬁts of partitioning a organization, to which we now turn.
4 The Beneﬁt of Partitioning a Design Process
There can be several reasons why partitioning a design process can be beneﬁcial. For
example, we may attribute it to the beneﬁt of specialization as in Schaefer (1999) or in
Becker and Murphy (1992). Alternatively, as pointed out by Baldwin and Clark (2000),
it may be because we have more number of smaller real options under a ﬁner partition of
the whole design process. We ﬁrst formulate our beneﬁt function by keeping loyal to the
original formulation by Baldwin and Clark (2000), and then deviate to a more general
beneﬁt function.
4.1 Baldwin and Clark’s Option Value
In a designing organization, each design task i has its own R&D activity, which yields
a potential value of a new design speciﬁcation. Let us denote by Xi the potential value
8created at design task i in the current period. As in Baldwin and Clark (2000), we assume
that Xi ∼ N(0,σ 2
i)a n dXi’s are independently distributed. Let σ =( σ1,···,σ n). In this
formulation, each design parameter already has a default design speciﬁcation, whose value
is normalized as zero.
Consider a partition P and a design team Sj ∈ P thereof. Sj will possibly have
several design tasks. We assume that the potential value created in Sj in the current
period is the sum of the potential value created by all the design tasks belonging to
Sj.T h u sXSj =
 
i∈Sj Xi ∼ N(0,
 
i∈Sj σ2
i). Denoting the potential value of the whole
system product by X,w et h u sh a v eX =
 n
i=1 Xi ∼ N(0,
 n
i=1 σ2
i). So if the results of
R&D activities in the current period are all adopted, there is no sense in partitioning the
product design.
However, recall that each design team functions as a unit of decision-making as to
the adoption of new designs in it. Also recall that the organization already has default
designs for respective design parameters whose values are normalized as zero. Then new
designs are adopted by the team Sj if and only if the sum of the potential values of new
designs in Sj turns out to be greater than the default value ex post. Thus the realized
value in Sj is a random variable X
+
Sj =m a x ( 0 ,X Sj). This is the reason why Baldwin and
Clark (2000) compared the value resulting from R&D activities to “real options.” The
realized value of the whole designing organization is the sum of those realized values of




Sj. Since the realized results of R&D activities are real options,
it makes sense to partition the designing process. As we shall see, it is more proﬁtable to
have many smaller options than to have one large option.
In the previous paragraph, we have made two assumptions concerning the value created
in a design organization. First, we assumed Xi’s are independently distributed. Second,
the value created in a larger unit is simply assumed to be the sum of values of smaller
units contained in it. These certainly require some justiﬁcation.
As we have seen, design tasks are usually intertwined with one another in a very
complicated manner in a grand design. However, such dependencies may be considered as
resolved each time by paying appropriate coordination costs as already formulated. This
means that the interdependent design tasks decide upon a speciﬁc interface and on such a
basis they work out their part independently. Given such coordination process, the value
they create may be assumed to be independent and also summable.
Realizing that E(X+)= ˆ σ √
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This value function has the following property.
Lemma 2 V (P,σ) is strictly decreasing in P and has strictly increasing diﬀerences in
(P,−σ).
Proof Pick any P   and P    from P(N)w i t hP   ≺ P   .T h e n
V (P





















Since P   ≺ P   , there exists Sj ∈ P    that is a union of at least two elements in P  .T h u s
it suﬃces to show that
 
σ2
i1 + ···+ σ2
ik + σ2








ik+1 + ···+ σ2
im < 0.
This is shown to be true by a simple calculation. Thus the ﬁrst part of the statement
holds. Pick any l with 1 ≤ l ≤ k and diﬀerentiating the left hand side of the above
inequality with respect to any σil. This yields
σil  
σ2







i1 + ···+ σ2
ik
< 0.
It is easy to see the same is true for l with k +1≤ l ≤ m.T h u sV (P   ,σ) − V (P  ,σ)i s
strictly decreasing in σ, which complete the proof. 
V (P,σ) is decreasing in P, because ﬁner partitions create more number of smaller real
options and the sum of their value is greater than the value of one large real option. This
is what Baldwin and Clark call the “value of splitting.” Thus partitioning a designing
organization is beneﬁtial. At this stage, some reader may realize that V (P,σ)−K(P,C,c)
is supermodular in P if V (P,σ) is supermodular in P. Unfortunately, however, V (P,σ)
is not necessarily supermodular in P. However, this lack of supermodularity does not
prevent us from conducting comparative statics analysis if we restrict our attention to a
chain on P(N).
4.2 A More General Beneﬁt Function
As we already stated, the beneﬁt of partitioning a design process can stem from another
factor: specialization. Following Schaefer (1999) and Becker and Murphy (1992), we will
10not delve into the foundations here, but just choose to formulate a real-valued beneﬁt
function in a reduced form B(P,β), where β ∈ R. We assume that B(P,β) is strictly
decreasing in P and supermodular in P. Some may wonder why we assume supermod-
ularity, although it turns out that V (P,σ) is not necessarily supermodular in P.T h i s
assumption is rather innocuous however. Even when B(P,β) is not supermodular in P,
the same comparative statics results obtain, if we restrict our attention to an optimization
problem over a chain on P(N) and we think this is a plausible situation.
We also assume that B(P,β) has strictly increasing diﬀerences. This means that the
marginal beneﬁt from increase in β is higher with coarser partition. In what follows,
we interpret β as the degree of generality in overall skill investment. A higer value of β
corresponds to the situation where members of the design organization invest in skills that
are more productive when they are engaged in a wider range of design tasks. Likewise, a
lower β corresponds to the situation in which specialized skill formation is prevalent.
5 Comparative Statics of Optimal Partitions
We are now in a position to derive comparative statics results by using the properties of
cost and beneﬁt function. First some comparative statics results regarding the optimal
partition are provided. We then go on to further analysis by endogenizing across-team
coordination costs.
5.1 Analysis of the Optimal Partition
Our objective function will be as follows, when we adopt the beneﬁt function ` al aB a l d w i n
and Clark, V (P,σ).
Π
BC(P,σ,C,c)=V (P,σ) − K(P,C,c)( 3 )
As already suggested, this beneﬁt function V (P,σ) is not generally supermodular in
P. Thus, this objective function is not necessarily supermodular in P. So we restrict the
constraint set, from which P is chosen, to a subset that is a chain rather than the set of
all possible partition of N.L e t a c h a i n o n P(N) be denoted PC(N). It is easy to see
that a chain in P(N) exists. Any chain is trivially a lattice. Any function is trivially
supermodular on a chain. Thus V (P,σ) is supermodular in P.
Restricting the domain to a chain might seem to be a major setback. However, doing
so makes sense. It is widely observed that organizations usually divide further or integrate
the currently existing sections when environmental parameters change. This means that
11organizations adjust their partition on some chain more frequently than on a general sub-
set of P(N). In other words, organization cannot escape from historical path dependence.
In this setup, the next proposition obtains.
Proposition 1 Let PC(N) ⊂P (N) be a chain. Consider the objective function
ΠBC(P,σ,C,c) as deﬁned in (3). Then,
(a). ΠBC(P,σ,C,c) is supermodular in (P,C,−c) on PC(N) and has strictly increasing
diﬀerences in (P,−σ).
(b). argmaxP∈PC(N) ΠBC(P,σ,C,c) is increasing in (C,−c,−σ).
Proof By Lemma 1, −K(P,C,c) has increasing diﬀerences in (P,(C,−c)). Obviously
−K(P,C,c) is supermodular in C and in −c as well as in P. Furthermore it has increasing
diﬀerences in (C,−c). Thus, by Fact 2, −K(P,C,c) is supermodular in (P,C,−c). Note
that this inference is correct regardless of the domain of P.S i n c eV (P,σ) is supermodular
in P on P(N), ΠBC(P,σ,C,c) is supermodular in (P,C,−c). Obviously, ΠBC(P,σ,C,c)
has strictly increasing diﬀerences in (P,−σ). This proves part (a).
Part (b) follows from the standard result about maximizing a supermodular function
on a lattice, i.e., Fact 4 in the Appendix. 
Next we go for a more general beneﬁt function. The objective function in this case
will be
Π
G(P,β,C,c)=B(P,β) − K(P,C,c). (4)
For this objective function, we have the next proposition:
Proposition 2 Consider the objective as deﬁned in (4). Then,
(a). ΠG(P,β,C,c) is supermodular in (P,β,C,−c).
(b). argmaxP∈P(N) ΠG(P,β,C,c) is increasing in (β,C,−c).
Proof As in the proof of Proposition 1, −K(P,C,c) is supermodular in (P,C,−c).
Since B(P,β) is also supermodular in (P,C,−c), ΠG(P,β,C,c) is supermodular in
(P,C,−c). Since B(P,β) has increasing diﬀerences in (P,β), so does ΠG(P,β,C,c). Fur-
thermore ΠG(P,β,C,c) has increasing diﬀerences in (β,C,−c)a n dβ is a value on a chain.
Thus by Fact 2 in the appendix, ΠG(P,β,C,c) is supermodular in (P,β,C,−c), which
complete the proof of part (a).
Part (b) follows from part (a) by Fact 4 in the Appendix. 
12It is common to both Proposition 1 and 2 that the optimal partition is increasing in
(C,−c). This means the followings: (1) as the cost of across-team coordination increases,
the optimal partition becomes coarser; (2) as the cost of within-team coordination in-
creases, the optimal partition becomes ﬁner. Speciﬁc to Proposition 1 is the prediction
about the eﬀect of uncertainty on optimal partition: (3) as the uncertainty regarding
the R&D activities conducted in each design task increases, the optimal partition be-
comes ﬁner. Proposition 2 contains the following prediction: (4) as the investment in skill
formation become more general, the optimal partition becomes coarser.
These results should be intuitive. When the cost of across-team coordination is high,
it is better to decrease the incidence of across-team coordination, namely to have a coarser
partition. If the cost of within-team coordination is low, it is better to have the coordi-
nation conducted within a team, which also means having a coarser partition. The result
on the eﬀect of uncertainty conﬁrms the result obtained by Baldwin and Clark (2000).
Finally, more general skills favor a large team size.
5.2 The Cost of Maintaining Coordination Devices
As has been already argued, across-team coordination is usually accomplished by means of
such coordination devices as a facsimile, telephone and the Internet etc. More generally we
may even suppose within-team coordination can be facilitated by installing some device.
However members within a team will mainly resort to face-to-face communication. Then it
would be rather natural to think that the design organization buy and install coordination
devices to reduce the cost of across-team coordination, with the cost of within-team
coordination ﬁxed exogenously.
We introduce such a cost as the cost of maintaining some level of diﬀerence between
across-team and within-team coordination costs. Let the diﬀerences in costs between
across-team and within-team coordination be denoted by z = C −c ∈ R
#A
+ .W ed e n o t ea
generic component of z by zij,w h e r e( i,j) ∈ A. The cost of maintaining a coordination
device that realizes cost diﬀerences z be denoted by κ(z,α), where α ∈ R1 is a parameter.
In what follows, we assume the following: (1) κ(z,α) is submodular in (z,−α)a n d;( 2 )
decreasing and concave in zij for each (i,j) ∈ A.
The ﬁrst assumption of submodularity in (z,−α) means both submodularity in z and
submodularity in (zij,−α)f o re a c h( i,j) ∈ A. The submodularity in z implies that
reduction in the cost diﬀerence at (i,j) ∈ A makes it less costly to reduce the cost
diﬀerence in (k,l)  =( i,j)i nA. Such a complementarity property would be easy to
13imagine, because the communication device across design teams usually have a network
eﬀect. On the other hand, the assumption of submodularity in (zij,α)i m p l i e st h a tt h e
marginal cost incurred in decreasing the cost diﬀerence at (i,j) decreases as α increases.
In this sense, α may be regarded as measuring the inexpensiveness of ICT investment. The
second assumption that κ(z,α)i sc o n c a v ei nzij for each (i,j) ∈ A means that allowing
larger cost diﬀerences in each (i,j) ∈ A saves increasingly more costs of maintaining
communication devices.
The following lemma gives a property of κ(C − c,α), the proof of which utilizes a
result on convex transformation of increasing supermodular functions (Topkis 1998, p.56,
Lemma 2.6.4).
Lemma 3 Suppose that κ(z,α) is submodular in (z,−α), and decreasing and concave
in zij for each (i,j) ∈ A.T h e nk(C − c,α) is submodular in (C,−c,−α) and decreasing
in (C,−c).
Proof Obviously, for each (i,j), zij = Cij − cij is increasing and supermodular in
(C,−c). Since κ(z,α) is submodular in z and decreasing and concave in zij for each
(i,j) ∈ A, −κ(z,α) is supermodular in z and increasing and convex in zij. Because
−κ(C − c,α) is a composite function of −κ(z,α)a n dzij = Cij − cij, it is supermodular
and increasing in (C,−c) by Fact 3 in the Appendix. Thus κ(C −c,α) is submodular and
decreasing in (C,−c).
By Fact 2 in the Appendix, increasing diﬀerences in variables and supermodularity in
each variable together imply supermodularity in those variables. Thus it suﬃces to show
that κ(C − c,α) has decreasing diﬀerences in (C,−α)a n d( −c,−α). Since −κ(z,α)i s
supermodular in (z,−α), it has increasing diﬀerences in (z,−α) by Fact 1 in the Appendix.
Then −κ(C −c,α) has increasing diﬀerences in (C,−α)a n di n( −c,−α). This completes
the proof. 
Some caveats are in order here about the speciﬁcation of cost function κ(C − c,α).
κ(C − c,α) may depend upon both Cij and cij in the present formulation. Some may
think that, given a partition, only cij or Cij should be included in κ(C−c,α) according to
whether (i,j) belongs to the same design team or not. However, in reality, organizations,
such as ﬁrms, do not set up communication devices speciﬁcally for each (i,j)e a c ht i m e ,
but always have some communication devices available and apply them when coordination
is necessary. For example, the arrangement may be such that face-to-face communication
is utilized within a team and the Internet is used for across-team communication. Then
14i and j will use either face-to-face communication or the Internet, according to whether
j ∈ S(i,P) or not. Thus choosing the level of (C,c) is choosing a speciﬁc kind of commu-
nication devices for within-team and across-team coordination. Even so, diﬀerent (i,j)’s
in A may incur diﬀerent coordination costs, because the diﬃculty of coordination may be
diﬀerent among (i,j)’s.
5.3 Comparative Statics Results with Endogenous Across-Team
Coordination Costs
Now we consider extended maximization problems with endogenous across-team coordi-
nation costs. According as we adopt the beneﬁt function ` a la Baldwin and Clark or a
more general beneﬁt function, we have the following objective functions.
Π
BC
E (P,σ,C,c,α)=V (P,σ) − K(P,C,c) − κ(C − c,α)( 5 )
Π
G
E(P,β,C,c,α)=B(P,β) − K(P,C,c) − κ(C − c,α)( 6 )
As a choice variable, C has to be chosen from a set {x : x ∈ R#A,x>c}. Rather than
having this constraint set, we assume that C is chosen from a ﬁxed set D ⊂ R#A such
that D is a sublattice of R#A and each member of D is greater than any possible value
of c. When the objective function (5) is adopted, the following proposition obtains.
Proposition 3 Let PC(N) ⊂P (N) be a chain. Suppose that, when C is a choice
variable, it is chosen from a sublattice D of R
#A
+ such that each C ∈ D is greater than
any possible value of c. Consider the objective function ΠBC
E (P,σ,C,c,α) as deﬁned in
(5). Then,
(a). Π(P,σ,C,c,α) is supermodular in (P,C,−c,−α) and has increasing diﬀerences in
(P,−σ).
(b). argmaxP∈PC(N) Π(P,σ,C,c,α) is increasing in (−σ,C,−c,−α).
(c). argmax(C,P):C∈D,P∈PC(N) Π(P,σ,C,c) is increasing in (−c,−α).
Proof As in the proofs of the previous propositions, −K(P,C,c) is supermodular in
(P,C,−c) and thus in (P,C,−c,α). Since V (P,σ) is supermodular in P on P(N), it is
supermodular in (P,C,−c). By Lemma 3, −κ(C − c,α) is supermodular in (C,−c,−α),
a n dt h u si n( P,C,−c,−α). These together imply that ΠBC
E (P,σ,C,c) is supermodular in
(P,C,−c,−α).
15By lemma 2, V (P,σ) has increasing diﬀerence in (P,−σ). Thus ΠBC
E (P,σ,C,c)h a s
increasing diﬀerence in (P,−σ). This proves part (a).
Part (b) follows from part (a) and Fact 4 in the Appendix. Part (c) follows from
application of Fact 4 and Fact 5 in the Appendix. 
In the case with a general beneﬁt function, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that, when C is a choice variable, it is chosen from a sublattice
D of R
#A
+ such that each C ∈ D is greater than any possible value of c. Consider the
objective function ΠG
E(P,β,C,c,α) as deﬁned in (6). Then,
(a). ΠG
E(P,β,C,c,α) is supermodular in (P,β,C,−c,−α).
(b). argmaxP∈P(N) ΠG
E(P,β,C,c,α) is increasing in (β,C,−c,−α).
(c). argmax(C,P):C∈D,P∈P(N)ΠG
E(P,β,C,c,α) is increasing in (β,−c,−α).
Proof Since B(P,β) is supermodular in P, has increasing diﬀerence in (P,β), and β is a
value on a chain, it is supermodular in (P,β). Thus it is supermodular in (P,β,C,−c,−α).
−K(P,C,c) is supermodular in (P,C,−c) and thus in (P,β,C,−c,−α). κ(C − c,α)i s
supermodular in (C,−c,−α) and thus in (P,β,C,−c,−α). All these together imply that
ΠG
E(P,β,C,c,α) is supermodular in (P,β,C,−c,−α).
Part (b) follows from part (a) and Fact 4. Part (c) follows from application of Fact 4
and Fact 5 in the Appendix. 
Here we have the following additional results: (1) as the cost of within-team coordina-
tion decreases, the chosen level of across-team coordination costs becomes higher and the
partition becomes coarser; (2) as the ICT investment becomes inexpensive, the chosen
level of across-team coordination costs becomes lower and the partition becomes ﬁner; (3)
as the skill formation becomes more general, the chosen level of across-team coordination
costs becomes higher and the partition becomes coarser.
5.4 Relation to Modularization
Baldwin and Clark (2000) deﬁnes “modularization in design” as a process of design ratio-
nalization. Suppose there are interdependencies among several design parameters, which
might involve a cycling and require complex coordination. Such intricate interdependen-
cies, however, can be eliminated by setting a “design rule” that each relevant designer
must obey. Carrying through this process results in a “modular structure” of the DSM as
16shown in Figure 5.4. Design rules are inserted at the top row and the leftmost column of
the original DSM. We now have modular blocks of design parameters. Within each block
















































Figure 2: An example of modular structure (adapted from Figure 3.4 of Baldwin and Clark
(2000)).
One of the major contributions of Baldwin and Clark (2000) is that they identiﬁed
the value-enhancing aspects of a modular design in the following points:
• Modularity creates options;
• Modular designs evolve as the options are pursued and exercised.
Section 4.1 of the present paper analyzed the ﬁrst point. However, we submit that the
modularization also works to reduce the coordination costs among designers.
The process of modularization can be very costly as experienced in the course of
modular design of IBM System/360, because ﬁnding all the potential interdependencies is
often diﬃcult and takes time. However, the cost of modularizing a design will be sunk once
it has been done. At a ﬁrst sight, it might appear that new costs are now to result from
the dependence of design parameters upon design rules. However they can be regarded
as negligible, because design rules are always visible to relevant designers and ﬁxed for
a relatively long period of time. After all, design rules determine the architecture and
the interfaces among several design parameters. Therefore we can safely abstract from
the cost arising from dependencies of design parameters upon design rules, and will do so
henceforth. Then, by modularization, interdependencies among design tasks are reduced
so that the coordination costs among them may also be substantially saved in the process
of designing new products consecutively.
17Our analysis of optimal partition should be relevant to the idea of “modularization”
described above. Indeed, it can be shown that the optimal partition cannot be strictly
coarser than the partition naturally induced by modularization. This implies that modu-
larization works to set an upper bound for the optimal partition. Let us now turn to the
formalization of this idea.
Generally a unique partition of N is associated to each grand design A in the following
natural manner. Let ˆ P be a partition of N such that
(i,j) ∈ A implies j ∈ S(i, ˆ P)
Namely any two dependent design parameters are contained in the same element of ˆ P.I t
is easy to see that such a partition necessarily exists, because the largest partition {N}
satisﬁes the condition. Let the set of all partitions of N that satisfy the above condition
be denoted by PA(N), which is a subset of P(N) and thus ﬁnite. Now pick any P   and P   
from PA(N) and consider P  ∧P   .P i c ka n y( i,j) ∈ A.S i n c eP  ,P   ∈P A(N), j ∈ S(i,P  )
and j ∈ S(i,P   ). Thus j ∈ S(i,P  )∩S(i,P   )=S(i,P  ∧P   ). So P  ∧P    ∈P A(N). Since
PA(N) is ﬁnite, there exists the smallest (thus unique) element P A in PA(N), which we
call partition induced by A.I ti so b v i o u st h a tK(P,C,c)=K(P A,C,c)f o re a c hP with
P A   P.
Proposition 5 Let P A be the partition induced by a grand design A.L e t
ΠBC
E (P,σ,C,c,α) be as deﬁned in (5) and suppose P ∗ ∈ argmaxP∈P(N) ΠBC
E (P,σ,C,c,α).
Then ¬P A ≺ P ∗.




However, since V (P,σ) is strictly increasing in P, V (P A,σ) >V(P ∗,σ). Thus we have
Π(P A,σ,C,c,α) > Π(P ∗,σ,C,c,α), which is a contradiction. 
A modular design induces a partition of N that is strictly ﬁner than {N}. Proposition
5 states that the optimal partition is not strictly coarser than the partition induced by a
modular design. Note that the choice set is not restricted to a chain in the hypotheses of
the above proposition. By restricting the choice set to a chain PC(N), the next corollary
holds.
Corollary 1 Let P A be the partition induced by A and let PC(N) be a chain containing
P A. Suppose that C is chosen from a sublattice D of R
#A
+ such that each C ∈ D is greater
than any possible value of c.
18(a). Then for each P ∗ ∈ argmaxP∈PC(N) ΠBC
E (P,σ,C,c,α), P ∗   P A.
(b). argmaxC∈D ΠBC
E (P ∗,σ,C,c,α)   argmaxC∈D ΠBC
E (P A,σ,C,c,α).
Proof Part (a) follows from Proposition 5 and the assumption that PC(N)i sac h a i n .
Part (b) follows from Proposition 1 (a). 
Thus a modular design makes the size of each team smaller. Since that in turn increases
the incidence of across-team coordination, a modular design induces more ICT investment
in order to reduce the cost of across-team coordination.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper analyzes the problem of optimally partitioning a product design or a design
organization, and derives several comparative statics results. The most natural and rig-
orous interpretation of our model is that there is a single agent who faces and solve
optimization problems. In this interpretation, the results obtained are concerned with
the characteristics observed in an integrated ﬁrm such as IBM faces. We believe that
there can be another interpretation of the model. Our comparative statics results may
be considered as approximating the outcome arising from the joint arrangement among
multiple ﬁrms. Although there are plenty of factors that lead to coordination failure, it
is expected that the most eﬃcient outcome will emerge through contractual and other
organizational arrangements.
When the coordination costs are assumed to be exogenous, our analysis shows the
followings: the optimal partition will be coarser, (1) if the cost of across-team coordination
is higher, (2) the cost of within-team coordination is lower, (3) the uncertainty concerning
R&D activities is lower, and (4) the degree of generality of skill is higher. The ﬁrst result
is a conﬁrmation of the result obtained in Schaefer (1999), and the third result coincide
with the insight by Baldwin and Clark (2000). Note however that our modeling approach
is diﬀerent from theirs.
In a setting where across-team coordination costs are endogenous, the following results
are obtained: a higher level of across-team coordination costs (lower level of ICT invest-
ment) and coarser partitions are induced by (1) lower cost of within-team coordination,
(2) higher cost of ICT investment, and (3) higher degree of generality of skill formation.
In our objective functions, higher across-team coordination costs and coarser partition are
complementary, and thus a change in some factor moves them in the same direction. For
19example, if the cost of within-team coordination is low enough, then a ﬁrm will tend to
rely more on within-team coordination than across-team coordination. Then the ﬁrm will
not want to have a ﬁner partition. Accordingly the ﬁrm will not invest much for reducing
the cost of across-team coordination.
These results seem to be consistent with some evidences, both casual and empirical. It
is well known that Japanese ﬁrms forged an eﬃciently working within-ﬁrm network based
upon their workers’ cultural homogeneity by the 1970s, which often used to be regarded
as one of the sources of their strength in the 1980s. However, it has also been argued
that the very same factor worked to prevent Japanese ﬁrms from making full use of the
emerging ICT such as the Internet in the 1990s (Ikeda 1997). One possible interpretation
of lower costs of within-team coordination in our model may be cultural homogeneity
among members of the team. Thus our result may explain the Japanese ﬁrms’ retarded
introduction of ICT in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, Japanese workers are known
to invest more in general communication skills than in specialized skills, which can be
interpreted as a higher degree of generality in skill formation in our model. Thus Japanese
workers’ tendency to investment in general skills might have been another cause of less
ICT investment of Japanese ﬁrms.
The same result is also instrumental to understanding the interesting comparison
of industrial regions between Silicon Valley and Route 128 by Saxenian (1994). She
observes that the Silicon Valley ﬁrms are marked by high mobility of workers, frequent
communications and substantial degrees of information sharing among diﬀerent ﬁrms,
quite in contrast to the Route 128 ﬁrms. Thus it would be natural to think that the cost
of across-ﬁrm coordination is substantially lower in Silicon Valley than in Route 128. The
above result may explain why there are a lot of small independent ﬁrms in Silicon Valley,
while large integrated ﬁrms are dominant in Route 128.
Our model exhibits the property that the chosen level of across-team coordination
cost becomes lower and the corresponding partition becomes ﬁner, as inexpensive ICT
becomes available. If we interpret this results in terms of a joint arrangement of many
ﬁrms and regard each team as an independent ﬁrm, it seems to suggest that the size of
ﬁrms decreases, as new ICT is developed and deployed by those ﬁrms. Such prediction
is in accordance with the empirical ﬁndings by Brynjolfsson, Maline, Gurbaxani, and
Kambil (1994) that ICT investment has lead to smaller ﬁrm size in the US.2
2Strictly speaking, interpreting each team in our model as an independent ﬁrm implies that the
boundary of a ﬁrm is determined by the ease of coordination. Brynjolfsson, Maline, Gurbaxani, and
20Furthermore, an interesting property of our model is that less expensive ICT, higher
cost of across-team coordination, lower cost of within-team coordination and ﬁner parti-
tions are all complementary in the objective function. As Milgrom and Roberts (1995)
demonstrated for the emerging paradigm of modern manufacturing ﬁrms, this means ne-
cessity for a systematic response. Namely, higher cost of within-team coordination and/or
lower cost of the ICT investment lead to a systematic response: more investment in ICT;
and ﬁner partitions of organization. Introducing the one without the other will not be
proﬁtable, and the one will induce the other. Actually the above two factors seem to go
together in the new paradigm of ICT.
The enormous impact of the recent development of ICT on economy has highlighted the
importance of such concepts as architecture, an interface, compatibility, standardization,
information encapsulation, modularization and so forth. All of these concepts concern the
process of designing a complex system. Today there seems to be a widespread belief that
they are indispensable for understanding the way that we conduct economic transactions.
The literature on this subject has begun to proliferate. The present paper can be regarded
as one of such contributions.
With respect to the concept of modularization, our model indicates that modulariza-
tion makes ﬁner partitions more favorable in the sense that it sets an upper bound for the
optimal partitions, and thus induces higher ICT investment to reduce the cost of across-
team coordination. In this loose sense, modularization, ICT investment and smaller size
of ﬁrms are all complementary.
The analysis in this paper sheds some light on the relationship between modulariza-
tion, ICT investment and smaller size of ﬁrms by considering the coordination costs in a
designing organization. However, our analysis is a static one. Probably more interesting
and important theme is to explore the dynamics of how a complex system evolves. That
will be a subject of another paper however.
Kambil (1994) explains this assertion by broadly interpreting coordination costs as “transaction cost” in
general. However this is the converse of the assertion that coordination becomes easier within a ﬁrm, for
which, to the best of our knowledge, there is no established theory. Our point is that the result is still
suggestive of the current tendency for the size of ﬁrms to decrease.
21Appendix
This appendix presents basic properties of supermodular functions and their maxi-
mization problems used in the paper for those who are not familiar with these analytical
tools. For more detailed exposition and the proofs, see Topkis (1998).
A binary relation   on a set X speciﬁes for all x  and x   in X either x    x   is true
or false. We usually write x  ≺ x   if x    x   and x   = x  . A binary relation   is reﬂexive
if x   x for each x ∈ X, antisymmetric if x    x   and x     x  imply x  = x  ,a n d
transitive if x    x   and x     x    imply x    x   . A binary relation is called a partial
ordering if it is reﬂexive, antisymmetric and transitive. A partially ordered set is a
set X on which there is a partial ordering  . A partially ordered set is a chain if it does
not contain an unordered pair of elements.
Let X be a partially ordered set and X  be its subset. If x  ∈ X and x   x  (x    x)
for each x ∈ X ,t h e nx  is an upper (lower) bound for X .I f x  in X  is an upper
(lower) bound for X ,t h e nx  is the greatest (least) element of X . If two elements, x 
and x  , of a partially ordered set X have a least upper bound (greatest lower bound) in
X,i ti st h e i rjoin (meet) and is denoted x  ∨ x   (x  ∧ x  ). A partially ordered set that
contains the join (least upper bound) and the meat (greatest lower bound) of each pair
of its elements is called a lattice.I fX  i sas u b s e to fal a t t i c eX and X  contains the join
and meet with respect to X of each pair of elements of X ,t h e nX  is a sublattice of X.
Let X and T be partially ordered sets and f(x,t) be a real-valued function on X ×T.
f(x,t)h a sincreasing diﬀerences, strictly increasing diﬀerences if f(x,t  )−f(x,t )
is increasing, strictly increasing in x for all t  ≺ t  . Suppose Xα is a partially ordered
set for each α ∈ A and f(x) is a real-valued function on ×α∈AXα. f(x)h a sincreasing
diﬀerences, strictly increasing diﬀerences on ×α∈AXα if for all distinct α  and α  
in A, f(x) has increasing diﬀerences, strictly increasing diﬀerences in (xα ,x α  ). Now
suppose X is a lattice and f(x) is a real-valued function on X. f(x)i ssupermodular if
f(x
 )+f(x
  ) ≤ f(x
  ∨ x
  )+f(x
  ∧ x
  )
for all x  and x   in X. f(x)i ssubmodular if −f(x) is supermodular. If f(x)a n dg(x)
are supermodular on X,t h e nf(x)+g(x) is supermodular on X.
Fact 1 shows that supermodularity implies increasing diﬀerences, while the converse
hold under certain conditions.
22Fact 1 If Xα is a lattice for each α ∈ A, X is a sublattice of ×α∈AXα,a n df(x) is
supermodular on X,t h e nf(x) has increasing diﬀerences on X.
Fact 2 If Xi is a lattice for i =1 ,···,n, f(x) has (strictly) increasing diﬀerences on
×n
i=1Xi and f(x) is (strictly) supermodular in xi on Xi for i =1 ,···,n,t h e nf(x) is
(strictly) supermodular on ×n
i=1Xi.
Fact 3 shows that increasing and convex transformation of increasing supermodular
functions results in a supermodular function.
Fact 3 If X is a lattice, fi(x) is increasing and supermodular on X for i =1 ,···,k,
Zi is a convex subset of R1 containing the range of fi(x) on X for i =1 ,···,k, Zi,a n d
g(z1,···,z k,x) is supermodular in (z1,···,z k,x) on (×k
i=1Zi) × X and is increasing and
convex in zi on Zi,t h e ng(f1(x),···,f k(x),x) is supermodular on X.
In order to conduct comparative statics, we have to compare the set of maximizers.
Suppose X is a lattice with ordering relation  .T h einduced set ordering   is deﬁned
on the collection of nonempty members of the power set of X such that X    X   if x  ∈ X 
and x   ∈ X   imply that x  ∧x   ∈ X  and x  ∨ x   ∈ X  .L e tL(X) be the collection of all
nonempty sublattices of a lattice X. It is easy to see that if X is a lattice, then L(X)i s
a partially ordered set with the ordering relation  . A function whose range is included
in the collection of all subsets of some set is a correspondence. A correspondence St is
increasing in t on T if the domain T is a partially ordered set, the range {St : t ∈ T}
is in L(X), and t  ≺ t   implies St    St   in L(X). The next fact is the main tool for
conducting comparative statics for the maximization problem on a lattice.
Fact 4 If X and T are lattices, S is a sublattice of X × T, St is a section of S at t in
T,a n df(x,t) is supermodular in (x,t) on S,t h e nargmaxx∈St f(x,t) is increasing in t
on {t : t ∈ T,argmaxx∈St f(x,t) is not empty}
The next fact implies that if one optimizes a system of complementary variables with
respect to any subset of the variables then the remaining variables would still be comple-
mentary.
Fact 5 If X and T are lattices, S is a sublattice of X × T, St is a section of S at t in
T,a n df(x,t) is supermodular in (x,t) on S,a n dg(t)=s u p x∈St f(x,t) is ﬁnite on the
projection ΠTS of S on T,t h e ng(t) is supermodular on ΠTS.
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